Since Israel's bombing of Iran's consulate on April 1, the region has been locked in an escalatory spiral. Signs show that Israel is pursuing a decisive showdown that will alter the balance of power for the foreseeable future. And Iran doesn't seem to have a choice but to meet that challenge.
Days passed without any reaction and western media reported that Iran was being convinced to hold back, saying that a retaliation would jeopardise talks for a ceasefire in Gaza. Although western media claiming knowledge of Iran's political decision-making are usually non-credible, Iran's UN mission did mention Iran hoped its response would not "harm" a potential ceasefire. Such naivety may seem uncharacteristic of Iran, but with Pezeshkian being freshly elected on a platform of working to remove sanctions, he may have made a successful case in Iran's internal decision-making process. This naivety would not last long.
The overreliance on offensive capabilities is a classic example of the offence-defence debate in world militaries. While Iran has poured significant resources into developing advanced air defence systems, these are produced in far too little numbers for a country of Iran's size. Iran's expansive borders may bless it with strategic depth, but they also make for airspace that is very difficult to defend. This in and of itself is a credible argument in favour of an offence-leaning military - especially when ground-based air defences aren't backed by a modern air force. However, in Iran's case the imbalance is excessive. The relative success of Israel's October 26 attack shows that long-term critiques of Iran's military posture were valid. Had Iran invested more heavily in mass-producing air-and-missile defences, and maintained an even moderately-sized modern air force (to threaten Israeli aircraft and defend a larger area), it would have been able to blunt the Israeli attack and make it considerably more risky.
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How did we get here?
Israel has a history of attacking Iranian interests at home and abroad. Israeli agents killed four Iranian scientists in 2010-2012 (with another narrowly surviving). It switched to unannounced aerial bombings of Iranian advisers in Syria in the mid-2010s and later to overt attacks which continue to the present day. Since 2020 Israel resumed its covert campaign of assassinations and sabotage inside Iran, most notably killing Mohsen Fakhrizadeh in 2020, and conducting the serious sabotage at the Natanz nuclear facility in 2021. These were accompanied by many more drone attacks, explosions, and cyber attacks in Iran, and aerial bombings of Iranian officers and Generals in Syria in 2022-23. Up until 2024, the most notable Iranian response was the mini-Tanker war in 2021 (which tapered off and ended towards 2023), in which both Iran and Israel struck merchant and commercial ships, again at a covert level.
Many Iranian analysts were critical of Iran's relative passiveness to this Israeli campaign, a frustration thought to be shared amongst some Iranian military-political leaders. Presumably, this included top IRGC leadership, the branch which had suffered the most losses in personnel and infrastructure. Ayatollah Khamenei's long-held cautious approach likely deemed such attrition acceptable amid the wider context.
After the Hamas operation against Israel in October 2023, Israel stepped up its attacks on Iranian interests, killing numerous IRGC Generals in Syria from December 2023 to January 2024. Iran, as before, did not respond in a meaningful way. That changed on April 1, when Israeli jets bombed Iran's consulate in Damascus.
A New Phase
Although Israel did not officially claim responsibility, attribution was not a subject of debate. Even by the standards of the established "equation" (already tipped in Israel's favour), the April 1 consulate bombing had blown past red lines. Two senior IRGC Generals had been killed (as before), but this time in a diplomatic building effectively equal to Iranian soil. The attack was too brazen for Iran to ignore.
Operation True Promise
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| Iranian ballistic missiles flying over the Al-Aqsa mosque, towards Israel |
In response, on April 13 Iran launched Operation True Promise, a combined drone and missile attack against Israel's Nevatim and Ramon airbases. Although this was a nominally large and comprehensive attack, Operation True Promise was largely symbolic in nature. Iran's extensive prior diplomatic messaging and engagement with regional countries was thought to have served as a deliberate tactic to allow the Israeli side - which included the US and other countries - to mount a defence. This was also evident in Iran's initial use of a large number of drones and cruise missiles, which took hours to reach Israel and therefore gave plenty of opportunity for interception by aircraft. These were launched prior to Iran's wave of ballistic missiles, comprised mainly of older generation missiles that are easier to intercept. As a result, only a few missiles impacted Nevatim airbase. The few missiles that struck Nevatim were of the advanced Kheybar Shekan type, signalling Iran's ability to penetrate Israeli defences with a qualitative advantage (rather than just overwhelming by numbers).
The main purpose of Operation True Promise was to demonstrate Iranian willingness to "change the equation" and strike Israel directly, something it had never done previously. However, Iran was still unwilling to be dragged into a wider war, hence the diplomatically and militarily calibrated nature of the attack.
Israeli Response
Israel's response to Operation True Promise on 19 April was relatively muted (and without direct attribution), but largely a mirror of Iran's strike in political intentions. Israel struck an S-300 radar in Isfahan, and though initially a separated missile booster found in Iraq was thought to have proven an Israeli ALBM to be the culprit, the extreme distance from the targeted radar ruled that out, as did the relatively light damage which seemed to point towards a quadcopter attack. As with Operation True Promise, it was a display of Israeli capability and will to strike Iran directly, even though it wasn't as "flashy" and caused similarly minor damage.
Assassination of Haniyeh
The killing of Ismail Haniyeh on July 31, seemingly after the previous round was concluded, was another serious escalation and had the effect of restarting the crisis. Haniyeh was a high-profile guest staying in the Sa'adabad complex, which was formerly used by Iranian monarchs, and is currently the Presidential Residence. Israel again did not claim responsibility for this attack, but carrying it out immediately after new President Pezeshkian's inauguration - which many foreign dignitaries attended - in one of the most politically sensitive locations in Iran (let alone Tehran) again left Iran humiliated and mulling a response.
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Days passed without any reaction and western media reported that Iran was being convinced to hold back, saying that a retaliation would jeopardise talks for a ceasefire in Gaza. Although western media claiming knowledge of Iran's political decision-making are usually non-credible, Iran's UN mission did mention Iran hoped its response would not "harm" a potential ceasefire. Such naivety may seem uncharacteristic of Iran, but with Pezeshkian being freshly elected on a platform of working to remove sanctions, he may have made a successful case in Iran's internal decision-making process. This naivety would not last long.
Nasrallah and Nilforoushan
After expanding its regional rampage to Lebanon, Israel assassinated Syed Hassan Nasrallah on September 27, dropping over 80 bombs on Hezbollah's headquarters in Beirut. Syed Nasrallah was personally close to Ayatollah Khamenei, and a highly respected figure in the Axis of Resistance. Killed alongside him was Iranian Brigadier General Abbas Nilforoushan, who had a long career in the IRGC.
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| Brigadier General Nilforoushan and Syed Hassan Nasrallah |
With the killing of Haniyeh, the Gazan death toll mounting, and now the martyrdom of Syed Nasrallah, Iranian decision makers were likely looking back to events since August with frustration. On September 29, President Pezeshkian repeated his earlier statement that western leaders had promised Iran a ceasefire in Gaza instead of it retaliating for Haniyeh's killing, adding that these were "complete lies". With Haniyeh, Nasrallah, and Nilforoushan's deaths over its shoulder, Iran saw itself as in danger of losing the new "equation" it had tried to set.
True Promise II
This time with no diplomatic consultations and little warning, Iran launched Operation True Promise II on October 1. In contrast to the strike in April, True Promise II was a pure ballistic missile attack with flight times as little as 12 minutes, instead of the 4-5 hours of drones. Iran also used a greater quantity of the advanced Kheybar-Shekan missiles, dozens of which struck Nevatim and Tel Nof airbases. This strike had even greater of a shock factor than True Promise I, due to the sheer quantity of missiles penetrating Israeli BMD. This seems to have been the main political objective of the strike - to demonstrate not only Iran's will to retaliate to Israel, but also the capability to bypass Israel's multibillion dollar missile defences.
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Israeli Response
On October 26, Israel carried out its first ever overt, direct attack on Iran. Using standoff air-launched ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as possibly internally launched drones, it struck air defence and missile production sites in the southwest and east of Iran, as well as in the capital of Tehran. While initial assessments point to relatively light damage, the attack killed 5 and was wide in scope and a few key radars - soft targets - will be inoperable for some time. Israel did not admit if similar damage was caused by Operation True Promise II (which can't be verified anyway...), but the limited satellite imagery from Iran's strike seemed to have suggested less damage, meaning Israel sought to escalate the level of destruction - even though it largely limited the strikes to military targets.
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| The four IRIADF soldiers martyred in Israel's attack |
Nevertheless, Iran cannot ignore the first overt military attack on Tehran in over 35 years. That basic principle is even more critical given the specific nature of the attack.
Israel didn't just attack simple military targets. It attacked the two most strategic aspects of Iran's military offence and defence - the strategic missile forces, and the sensitive long-range radars and (it claims, till time of writing with no publicly available evidence) strategic air defence systems. While Israel doesn't have the capability to destroy Iran's deeply buried "missile cities" - which house massive stockpiles of missiles and launching capability to boot - the targeting of Iran's production facilities is a clear signal of a willingness to try and cripple Iran's long-term military capabilities. And it has said that its strikes on air defence sites allow it "wider freedom of action" over Iran. Such threats should not be taken lightly given the past 15 years of direct and indirect Israeli attacks on Iran at home and abroad.
Military Implications
The direct exchanges between Iran and Israel leading up to and including the October 26 highlight principles behind Iran's military posture, and why it sometimes fails.
Offensively, Iran's ballistic missile program has shown it can reliably penetrate Israeli defences, at long range and at a large scale. Such capability would have been a dream for Iran's Air Force even in the 1970s. However, Iranian BMs have thus far only shown impressive accuracy at short and medium ranges. In both Operations True Promise I and II, Iran's BMs lacked the precision and destructive power to significantly damage Israel's military, especially at the latter's hardened airbases. There are certain capabilities that Iran is yet to employ, but which it may hold in reserve for future strikes.
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| Bavar-373 TEL - this advanced system has been produced in too few numbers |
The overreliance on offensive capabilities is a classic example of the offence-defence debate in world militaries. While Iran has poured significant resources into developing advanced air defence systems, these are produced in far too little numbers for a country of Iran's size. Iran's expansive borders may bless it with strategic depth, but they also make for airspace that is very difficult to defend. This in and of itself is a credible argument in favour of an offence-leaning military - especially when ground-based air defences aren't backed by a modern air force. However, in Iran's case the imbalance is excessive. The relative success of Israel's October 26 attack shows that long-term critiques of Iran's military posture were valid. Had Iran invested more heavily in mass-producing air-and-missile defences, and maintained an even moderately-sized modern air force (to threaten Israeli aircraft and defend a larger area), it would have been able to blunt the Israeli attack and make it considerably more risky.
This imbalance of defence priorities has resulted in a situation in which Iran finds itself a situation it has avoided for decades - direct military confrontation with a foreign power.
Redefining the Region
"They have not yet managed to understand the strength, capability, will, and initiative of the Iranian nation. We must make them understand."
Ayatollah Khamenei, October 27 2024
Iran now finds itself in a situation where it has suffered numerous assassinations on its soil and in the region. Whether by design or opportunism, the infamously messianic Netanyahu has escalated his maximalist, military-heavy tactics into a regional campaign. Iran and Israel now face each other at a critical juncture that could shape the region.
Israel has pushed Iran to a direct military exchange and made clear that it has Iran's critical capabilities in its sights, openly stating that it is ready to make good on those threats. Iran meanwhile cannot unilaterally de-escalate without effectively normalising Israeli attacks on Iranian soil. Iranian leaders now have to face the threat head on. Whichever side comes out on top could drive the regional order in its favour and "set the rules" going forward.
Clearly, in a formal war neither side can "conventionally" defeat the other. The side that can break the resolve of the other and force it to relent would emerge a victor, if a battered one. This means that attrition is the key determinant of victory. Neither side has a clear advantage in this sense - Iran has vast strategic depth, a resilient military strategy and industry, and heavily hardened strategic capabilities. Meanwhile, Israel has a dense and overlapping air defence network, powerful intelligence agencies, and an overwhelming airpower superiority supplied by American military, financial, and political aid.
Both sides also have clear weaknesses. Iran has a thinly spread air defence network that could leave sensitive targets vulnerable to incisive attacks. It also has highly concentrated economic (oil and gas) and politically sensitive (nuclear) centres. Iran would also likely face intense western pressure and coercion in those same realms. Israel, meanwhile, is in a highly precarious regional position balancing a multitude of threats. Its small size forces its military-industrial complexes to be highly concentrated, representing a lack of strategic depth. Perhaps most importantly, its society is highly sensitive to casualties, and this society has recently seen its vaunted missile defences bypassed and possibly on the verge of total depletion, leaving it completely open to attacks. Israel is therefore more likely to favour a short, intense war in which it can cause a lot of damage quickly, before Iran can exhaust its defences and grind it down with missiles and drones.
The west would play a key part in shaping that campaign - even in the most recent exchanges, they have always emphasised Israel's "right to defend itself" while urging Iran to not respond to "prevent further escalation" - a clear double standard.
The American Angle
There is a tangible risk of the US getting directly involved, willingly or unwillingly, in a war between Iran and Israel. The Biden administration has shown unprecedented fealty to Israel (even by American standards), giving material and political support to every one of its attacks in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Iran, despite Israel's repeated war crimes and provocations. In both of Iran's True Promise operations, it directly took part in intercepting Iranian missiles, and provided Israel with significant intelligence and early warning support. It has already transferred a THAAD battery (Israel has requested a second) after Operation True Promise II, expected to try and defend Israel against another Iranian operation. Presumably Israel's BMD is depleted enough to warrant this. There is not yet any evidence of direct US military support in Israel's offensive operations against Iran, but with the heavy presence of US logistical, intelligence-gathering, and electronic warfare aircraft around Iran's borders, this cannot be ruled out in past or future.
While American officials insist - to some extent honestly - that they don't want to get involved, that does not mean they don't want Israel to "win" such a potentially decisive confrontation. They would no doubt continue to give Israel diplomatic carte blanche, supply it with any offensive weapons it desires, and would continue to conduct ostensibly "defensive" direct action (such as missile and drone interceptions) intended to hamper Iran's ability to attrit Israel. Concealable non-kinetic offensive support is also possible, such as aerial refuelling, electronic warfare, and in cyberspace. It could also provide intelligence and reconnaissance support similar to what it has provided Ukraine - whether from satellites or aircraft outside or even (if concealed) inside Iranian airspace.
Direct confrontation is unlikely but could occur under stressed conditions - such as if Iranian missiles hit US forces in Israel, or if the US militarily blocks potential Iranian naval action such as those that took place in 2019 - this would require the US to escalate its involvement similar to how it did in 1987-88.
Collision Course
After more than a decade of exchanging covert blows, Iran and Israel are now engaged in a series of direct strikes. Neither side is willing to back down, and the conflict may now have reached a self-sustaining momentum that can only conclude in a decisive outcome. Both sides recognise that this would be highly destructive - but could also permanently change the regional balance of power.
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