Are Iran and the US sleepwalking into a war?

On 28th January three US soldiers were killed and dozens injured in a drone strike on the Tower-22 base in Jordan, directly adjacent to the contested Al-Tanf garrison in Syria.

No group took responsibility for the attack until several hours later, when the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (which the US doesn't differentiate from Kata'ib Hezbollah) put out a statement. Based on US reports that the drone shadowed an American drone returning to base, it seems the successful strike was lucky or even an accident, after over 160 similar previous attacks without deaths. Nevertheless, the significant casualties it caused have set into motion a number of possibilities that had been laying in the background since the eruption of the regional conflict on Oct 7.

The US has been trickling out reports that it will retaliate, and on Wednesday certain US officials described it as a "multitiered", forceful campaign that could last "weeks". That is a significant military action in its own right - even if only targeting Kata'ib Hezbollah - and would bring the US to the forefront of the regional conflict, rather than just being seen as playing a supporting role to Israel. Even more concerningly, they have also said targets could include "Iranian targets outside Iran".

That carries very high escalatory risks, partially because the nature of these targets has been kept deliberately vague. "Iranian targets outside Iran" could mean anything from disused bases in Syria formerly used by the IRGC, up to the Behshad intelligence ship operating around Yemen. 

Just using the Behshad as an example - if it does end up being a target, it's unlikely it would be attacked in the same manner as the Saviz, which suffered small-scale but effective sabotage to its engine room as part of the covert drone/shipping war between Iran and Israel in 2021. The Behshad is reported to provide intelligence support to Ansarullah, who have been using ballistic and cruise missiles in the Red Sea. This is in stark contrast to the covert conflict between Iran and Israel, and in that context American forces would likely aim to capture or sink the Behshad. Given the Behshad is accompanied by IRIS Alborz, a recognised Iranian warship, it's easy to envisage such an action by the US rapidly escalating into direct conflict.

Another recent report by CBS News says that the US plans to hit "Iranian personnel and facilities" over "a number of days". All this is described very matter-of-fact by media, despite how seriously tensions increased after recent Israeli assassinations of Iranian commanders in Syria. If Iranian personnel are killed in overt action by American forces, their pictures and names displayed in Iranian media as martyrs, it's hard to imagine a scenario in which Iran does not retaliate.

The muted media coverage despite all these factors is what concerns me. It suggests that these risks are being ignored by both the US and Iran, which are usually more vocal to media when there is a possibility of direct confrontation.

While the usual suspects in the US have been making their trademark warmongering statements, there has been little pushback to these statements from the Biden administration. In fact, Biden officials have been talking about this operation almost as if it's routine. Media reporting is largely business as usual, with coverage of the US plans relatively low-key and plenty of other news making it to headlines. But as discussed above, the few details we have got indicate the potential targets and nature of the operation are anything but routine. 

Biden officials have claimed they don't want a war with Iran, which I believe is a sincere statement. But just because it's sincere doesn't mean that's definitely what's going to happen. 

There is a real possibility for miscalculation, namely that the US may carry out an attack that it deems proportionate but could in fact be highly escalatory. Iran would then feel it has no choice but to respond.

On the subject of Iran - they seem to not be cottoning on to the risks either.

Only yesterday did Iran say it would respond to an American attack on its interests. This came days after the US had already been indicating it held Iran responsible and would retaliate appropriately. Iran's statements may be too little, too late and could have had the effect of signalling to the Americans that they're "ok with" the scope of the retaliation the US has been trickling to the media. When in fact this is unlikely to be the case. After all, the last time America killed Iranian personnel was in January 2020.

The Kata'ib Hezbollah Angle

On Tuesday Kata'ib Hezbollah said they were suspending operations against the US. A couple of things stood out.

Firstly, it was clear in their own statement that they were not happy about this decision, which was reportedly made at the behest of a "top IRGC Commander" heavily implied to be BG E. Qaani. The public display of dissatisfaction is an indication of the much greater autonomy of the resistance axis and especially KH since Soleimani's murder.

Secondly (and likely the reason KH are upset) this stand down is after the Tower-22 strike attributed to KH, and before the US goes on a pre-advertised campaign against KH in retaliation for said strike. Why is Iran restricting KH from defending itself against what is said to be a days or weeks-long campaign? Even for the usually cautious Iranian leadership, this is unusually passive. 

It could be related to the portion of KH's statement that said they made this move to avoid "embarrassment" for the Iraqi government. This may be connected to recent reports that Iraq has started discussions with the US about a withdrawal of American troops from Iraq. Qaani's pitch to KH may have effectively been to take the hit to curry favour with the Iraqi government. The US going on an extended campaign, furthering the appearance of instability and conflict, is the opposite of what the Iraqi government wants. The optics of this may hasten the American exit from Iraq while Kata'ib Hezbollah could win political favour in Iraq by displaying restraint.

There are other takeaways from the KH suspension - it could be a simpler de-escalatory move, but this is less likely as nobody expects the US not to retaliate even after KH's unilateral ceasefire. And the US has already said it will still be striking "Iranian targets outside Iran", so it's unlikely that some sort of deal has been struck between Iran and the US.

Collision Course

In a way this moment has been coming since Oct 7.

America as the superpower and global hegemon has its own role to play, which traditionally (for hegemons) is to maintain the status quo. American officials say they seek to prevent a wider conflict in the region, but to truly do that they would have to address the Israeli genocide in Gaza, which they are clearly not willing to do. The US claims they seek a state for Palestinians as the solution, but in practice they have consistently proven unwilling to address Israeli obstructionism. Instead they decided - as per usual - to exercise hard power to assert control over the region by force. "Treating" the symptoms rather than the root cause.

Iran also has its own role to play. As a regional power and the leader of the Resistance Axis, its objectives are fundamentally based on challenging the status quo. Iran sees itself as a defender of oppressed peoples, and this is evident in elements of Iran's ideology and that of groups such as Hezbollah and Ansarullah. It therefore has to be seen to be aiding the regional uprising of sorts against the Israeli, which cannot be seen to have a free hand to commit genocide in Gaza.

And now the US and Iran, leaders of opposite sides of the regional order, look to be nearing the intersection point of their respective collision courses.

...both Iran and the U.S. may be misreading each other...

Tehran may have wrongly assumed that the Biden administration would not be willing to strike directly at Iran, and Washington may have incorrectly calculated that Iran would pull back from a direct confrontation after a succession of limited U.S. airstrikes against Iranian-backed militia and Houthi forces in Yemen.  

“They’re trying to deter us and not recognizing that, eventually, we won’t be deterred. And then, we’re doing the same with them”

Michael Knights, Washington Institute, via NBC