What the fall of Afghanistan means for Iran

In 1998, 8 Iranian diplomats and a journalist at the Iranian consulate in Mazar-i-Sharif were murdered by Taliban forces, which controlled the city at that time. What followed were months of tensions, with Iran deploying tens of thousands of troops and heavy weaponry at the border, and cross-border skirmishes breaking out. All out war however, was avoided.

As I write this piece, the Taliban are sweeping through Afghanistan. In the past 8 days, they have captured 16 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces and show no sign of slowing down. The Afghan National Army is crumbling, and the only foreign troops coming in are tasked with evacuating embassies.

Iranian tanks lined up on the Afghan border in 1998

The Taliban are telling the world that they have changed. But have they? And what does their seemingly imminent rule of the country mean for Iran?

The only positive about the Taliban taking over is that it will mark the end of US and other Western countries' military presence in the country. It was from Afghanistan that the US sent the RQ-170 "Beast of Kandahar" drone to spy on Iran's nuclear sites.

Yet the US presence was also keeping the Taliban busy, and was a drain on the US' own resources to the tune of $2 trillion. All with little to no cost to Iran. With the US gone, the Taliban will soon have control of Afghanistan and Iran will have to deal with the consequences.

While the Taliban claim they are tolerant of other sects, their presence will clearly pose an increased risk to Afghanistan's sizeable Shia minority, which Iran has a duty to protect. Iran will need to closely watch the Taliban's actions towards the Shia community, and apply pressure as it sees fit. However, the Taliban has an ally in Pakistan, which could relieve any economic pressure by offering trade access. Political pressure will be effectively impossible, with Taliban control likely to wipe out most of the soft influence Iran had gained over the years. And as 4 decades of American and Soviet failure has demonstrated, serious military pressure is in the long term, largely a mistake. Saying that, massacres of the recent past have all been attributed to ISIS-K, not the Taliban. One hopes that the Taliban continue to leave the Shia be, and make good on their promises to fight ISIS-K. Iran does not want to have to resort to punitive strikes due to possible Taliban complicity. While these may deter future attacks, they could also spiral out of control and prompt terrorist attacks on Iran's own soil, given the long border with Afghanistan.

The Taliban's ideology also makes them suitable bedfellows with Saudi Arabia, which could repeat its blueprint of funding and supporting anti-Iranian terrorist groups as it did with Jundullah/Jaish ul-Adl, who are based in Pakistan and conduct cross-border attacks. Afghanistan would be an even more fertile and complicit breeding ground for such activities than Pakistan.

Taliban control of Afghanistan will suit Pakistan's feud with India, which has been competing with Pakistan for influence in the country. The Taliban are unlikely to be as receptive to Indian advances as the current rapidly shrinking republic. This may result in India dropping its investments in Chabahar port and the accompanying rail link to Afghanistan, a trade route that Iran was hoping to use to revitalise the economic and strategic prospects of Sistan-Baluchestan province. The Chabahar port development in particular would be a serious loss, as Chabahar is Iran's only deepwater port, and would be useful as a home base for future Iranian naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

In reality, we can't be completely sure how Taliban control of Afghanistan will turn out for Iran. The group's claims of moderation cannot be trusted. Will the Taliban govern an actual country, or a terrorist fiefdom?