Yesterday the US committed a crime so heinous, so stupid, that it is only right that we discuss the appropriate response. Usually I am dismissive of calls for or fear of war - but this time, direct military conflict between Iran and the US is on the cards, and even rarer so; the cards are in the hands of Iran.
Despite their statements to the contrary, the US assassination of Lieutenant General Qassem Soleimani was a reckless escalation of mind-bending proportions. Aside from the fact that murdering a high-ranking General of a sovereign nation is easily an act of war, and one that can serve as a casus belli for any nation state; the prominence and standing of Qassem Soleimani magnify the effects to eye-watering scale.
Iranian Generals have been killed in Syria before, with dubious circumstances - but the US did it with a drone strike, outside Baghdad International Airport, and then set about bragging publicly from middling congressmen and senators to departmental statements to officials, and of course Trump himself. On top of that, they killed the most publicly recognisable General possible, who was possibly among the most popular living leaders in Iran. Soleimani was also highly regarded throughout the Shia world as their defender and instrumental in the fight to defeat ISIS. It is fair to say that the Shia world and especially Iran had an emotional attachment to Qassem Soleimani and the symbolism of his martyrdom cannot be overstated.
It is these factors that add to the argument that Soleimani's assassination provides a valid casus belli. While Iran's status as defined by the US (and therefore the West) as a "pariah" would usually raise the threshold required for a valid (jus ad bellum) casus belli, the extraordinarily high profile of Qassem Soleimani has raised the US escalation to meet that inflated threshold.
In a broad sense, Iran has two options.
Despite their statements to the contrary, the US assassination of Lieutenant General Qassem Soleimani was a reckless escalation of mind-bending proportions. Aside from the fact that murdering a high-ranking General of a sovereign nation is easily an act of war, and one that can serve as a casus belli for any nation state; the prominence and standing of Qassem Soleimani magnify the effects to eye-watering scale.
Iranian Generals have been killed in Syria before, with dubious circumstances - but the US did it with a drone strike, outside Baghdad International Airport, and then set about bragging publicly from middling congressmen and senators to departmental statements to officials, and of course Trump himself. On top of that, they killed the most publicly recognisable General possible, who was possibly among the most popular living leaders in Iran. Soleimani was also highly regarded throughout the Shia world as their defender and instrumental in the fight to defeat ISIS. It is fair to say that the Shia world and especially Iran had an emotional attachment to Qassem Soleimani and the symbolism of his martyrdom cannot be overstated.
It is these factors that add to the argument that Soleimani's assassination provides a valid casus belli. While Iran's status as defined by the US (and therefore the West) as a "pariah" would usually raise the threshold required for a valid (jus ad bellum) casus belli, the extraordinarily high profile of Qassem Soleimani has raised the US escalation to meet that inflated threshold.
In a broad sense, Iran has two options.
- Iran could respond in such a way that revenge is exacted, but still below the threshold of war. It would involve acting indirectly through its allies in Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon. Iran could also leverage its capabilities in Afghanistan, where the US is arguably the most exposed and the cost for Iran is the lowest. This course of action would be stopping short of war, but would likely involve the various militias in these countries conducting widespread attacks against US troops and creating general chaos. Iraqi militias would likely be well on board with this given the assassination also killed Iraqis, including Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the Commander of Kata'ib Hezbollah.
This option has a clear advantage and disadvantage:
Advantage: Low risk of direct US military response
Disadvantage: Higher chance that deterrence is not sufficiently restored - Iran could invoke its casus belli. The argument here being that direct action is the only proportional response. This could come in many forms - more incisive, high profile attacks by Iraqi militias that could prove too much to ignore for the US, or direct missile strikes (framed as being punitive in nature) from Iran against US bases in Iraq among others.
However, since Iran does not want to be seen as the one who starts a direct conflict, it could try to respond in such a way that will provoke the US into attacking Iran first, and have the US be seen as the aggressor. In this scenario, Iran wants a limited direct conflict, but it does not want to be seen as the aggressor. The punitive strikes by Iran would be publicly framed as restoring deterrence in the face of US crimes - any reaction by the US would be framed as unjustified.
The advantages and disadvantages in this path are opposite to Option 1.
Advantage: Higher chance that deterrence is restored
Disadvantage: High risk of a "lose" scenario.¹
¹ There are several outcomes if Iran chooses Option 2.
Outcome 1: Iran invokes its casus belli (in whatever form), but the US does not respond (low probability). This would be a "win" scenario.
Outcome 2: The US responds directly (militarily) to Iran's choice, and Iran wins the ensuing (limited) military conflict. This would also be a "win" scenario.
Outcome 3: The US responds directly (militarily) to Iran's choice, and Iran loses the ensuing (limited) military conflict. This would be a "lose" scenario.
The reason for Option 2 being High risk is that there is uncertainty in how the US will respond to Iran effectively "daring" them to do something. They could not respond at all (unlikely), they could respond weakly, or they could respond forcefully (Outcome 1-3). Either way, any direct (even limited) military conflict with the US is inherently risky due to the US' conventional military strength.
As an additional note: There are a few "free" things Iran can do separately from any conflict, with little to no risk of repercussions.
Iran could take a very large step in its next scheduled JCPOA commitment withdrawal, such as restarting 20% uranium enrichment, installing large numbers of advanced centrifuges in Fordow, and even leaving the Additional Protocol. Iran would have effectively left in the JCPOA in all but name.
Iran could also start a series of MRBM tests, or instruct the IRGC-N to be less "courteous" in the Persian Gulf.
I cannot claim that I know what Iran is going to do next, but my gut feeling is that it will be big. The tanker explosions, the Aramco attacks, the shootdown of the US RQ-4 UAV are all examples of spectacular Iranian actions, and none were in such serious circumstances. One thing is for certain - Iran is in the driving seat now. Iran decides whether there will be war, or not. That opportunity has not existed since the US shootdown of an Iranian airliner in 1988, when Iran was already at war with Saddam's Iraq. Among any point in the Islamic Republic's history, this is the opportunity at which it is best prepared and positioned for war.
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| Just one of many images of Iranians reacting to the assassination of Qassem Soleimani |
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